

HMDC Presents... CRISIS - FUTURISTIC SC: Part 2 (The United Nations)

HMDC Presents... Futuristic Security Council: Security Council of 2100: Use of Space (Research Report, December 2026)

Prepared for HMDC Forensics delegates attending Harvard Model United Nations Online, December 5-6, 2026. Every fact below comes from a page or official document that was opened and read in October 2026. Each evidence entry repeats its publication and date so the source is always visible.

This committee is set in the year 2100, but the year 2100 does not exist yet. Everything in the evidence entries is about the real world of 2026 and earlier. Anything about 2100 is clearly marked **FICTION (2100 ASSUMPTION)** so that no delegate mistakes an invented scenario for a fact.

WHAT OUR CHAIRS WILL FOCUS ON

Harvard tells us that our committee is a meeting of the Security Council in the year 2100, at a time when space technology has grown very fast and many more nations are active in space. Our chairs will ask us to deal with three main questions: weapons and military power in space, whether a nation may claim part of space as its own territory, and what a nation can do when another nation damages its satellites, bases or other equipment in space. We will mix real policy and technology from today with an imagined future, and we will respond to new problems as the crisis changes. In the end, the Council must decide rules and make sure they are followed, so that we "enforce rulings for fair behavior in the next frontier" (Harvard Model United Nations, HMUN Online Committee Page, Last Accessed: October 2026).

<https://www.harvardmun.org/security-council-online>

The parts of this report that match that focus most closely are Sections 1B, 1C and 1D (weapons, behaviour rules and anti-satellite tests), Section 1F with Sections 3A, 3B and 3F (claims on the Moon and on space resources), Sections 2B, 2C, 2E and 2H (the treaties, the Security Council votes and where each bloc stands), Section 2I (redress after damage) and Section 2J (claims to regions of space).

How we use this report: Our first priority is weapons, territorial claims and repair or payment after damage, because those are the three areas Harvard names. Space debris takes up a large share of this report (much of Section 1A, plus Sections 1E, 2D, 3C and 3H), so we use debris mostly as background, or as one kind of damage that one nation causes to another, not as the main topic of our speeches. Sections 2F (disasters and development) and 3I (radio frequencies) are background only. Redress is the question of how a nation that was harmed gets its loss repaired or paid back. Section 2I collects the real tools that exist today (the Liability Convention, the Cosmos 954 settlement, reports to the UN and ITU interference complaints), and Section 2J collects the real disputes over claims to space, so we read both closely and then prepare our own ideas for how the Council could judge a complaint and enforce its decision.

PART 2, THE UNITED NATIONS RECORD

The UN has built most of space law. Between 1963 and 1979 it produced a declaration and five treaties that remain the foundation of space law today. Since then, the UN has mostly produced non-binding guidelines and recommendations, because countries have not agreed on new treaties. The Security Council itself has adopted no resolution on space in the official record checked for this report, and its one major attempt, in April 2024, was vetoed.

2A. TABLE OF UN RESOLUTIONS AND INSTRUMENTS

Every symbol below was confirmed on an official UN site (documents.un.org, undocs.org, press.un.org or unoosa.org); each one was rechecked against the official UN document on October 14, 2026.

Symbol	Year	Body	What it does
A/RES/1348 (XIII)	1958	General Assembly	Created an ad hoc committee on the peaceful use of outer space, the first step toward COPUOS.
A/RES/1472 (XIV)	1959	General Assembly	Set up the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) with 24 members.
A/RES/1721 (XVI)	1961	General Assembly	Stated that international law applies to space and asked states to register launches with the UN.
A/RES/1884 (XVIII)	1963	General Assembly	Called on states not to place nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass

			destruction in orbit.
A/RES/1962 (XVIII)	1963	General Assembly	Adopted the Declaration of Legal Principles for the exploration and use of space.
A/RES/2222 (XXI)	1966	General Assembly	Approved the Outer Space Treaty, the foundation of space law.
A/RES/2345 (XXII)	1967	General Assembly	Approved the Rescue Agreement on returning astronauts and space objects.
A/RES/2777 (XXVI)	1971	General Assembly	Approved the Liability Convention on paying for damage caused by space objects.
A/RES/3235 (XXIX)	1974	General Assembly	Approved the Registration Convention requiring states to register space objects.
A/RES/34/68	1979	General Assembly	Approved the Moon Agreement, which calls lunar resources the common heritage of mankind.
A/RES/37/92	1982	General Assembly	Adopted principles on using satellites for international direct television broadcasting.
A/RES/41/65	1986	General Assembly	Adopted principles on remote sensing of the Earth from space.
A/RES/47/68	1992	General Assembly	Adopted principles on the safe use of nuclear power sources in space.
A/RES/51/122	1996	General Assembly	Declared that space cooperation should benefit all states, especially developing countries.
A/RES/59/115	2004	General Assembly	Clarified which state counts as the "launching state" responsible for a space object.
A/RES/61/110	2006	General Assembly	Created UN-SPIDER to share satellite data for disaster response.
A/RES/62/101	2007	General Assembly	Recommended ways for states to improve registration of space objects.
A/RES/62/217	2007	General Assembly	Endorsed the COPUOS Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines.
A/RES/68/50	2013	General Assembly	Encouraged states to use voluntary transparency and confidence-building measures in space.
A/RES/68/74	2013	General Assembly	Recommended what national space laws should include.
A/RES/72/250	2017	General Assembly	Created an expert group to study a binding instrument against an arms race in space.
A/RES/73/91	2018	General Assembly	Annual resolution on international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space (UNISPACE+50 year).
A/RES/74/82	2019	General Assembly	Welcomed the 21 Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities.
A/RES/75/36	2020	General Assembly	Asked states to identify responsible and irresponsible behaviour in space.
A/RES/76/3	2021	General Assembly	Adopted the "Space2030" Agenda on space as a driver of sustainable development.
A/RES/76/230	2021	General Assembly	Urged further practical measures to prevent the placement of weapons in space.
A/RES/76/231	2021	General Assembly	Created an open-ended working group on norms of responsible behaviour in space.
A/76/20, Annex III	2021	COPUOS	Adopted the mandate and five-year workplan of the Legal Subcommittee's Working Group on Legal Aspects of Space Resource

			Activities (see 3B).
A/AC.105/1262	2021	COPUOS (document)	Circulated China's report under Article V of the Outer Space Treaty on two Starlink close approaches to its space station (see 2I).
A/RES/77/41	2022	General Assembly	Called on all states to commit not to conduct destructive anti-satellite missile tests.
A/RES/78/20	2023	General Assembly	Created a new open-ended working group on reducing space threats.
A/RES/78/238	2023	General Assembly	Annual resolution on further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space.
S/2024/302 (draft, vetoed)	2024	Security Council	Draft affirming the ban on nuclear weapons in orbit; vetoed by Russia, 13 in favour, China abstaining.
S/2024/383 (draft, not adopted)	2024	Security Council	Russian-led draft on not placing any weapons in space; failed with 7 in favour, 7 against, 1 abstention.
A/RES/79/1	2024	General Assembly	Pact for the Future; Action 56 calls for new frameworks on space traffic, debris and resources.
A/RES/79/18	2024	General Assembly	Affirmed the duty not to place weapons of mass destruction in orbit.
A/RES/79/19	2024	General Assembly	Annual resolution on preventing an arms race in outer space.
A/RES/80/19	2025	General Assembly	Annual resolution on preventing an arms race in outer space; welcomed the new consolidated working group set up by decision 79/512.
A/RES/80/20	2025	General Assembly	Encouraged a political pledge of "no first placement" of weapons in space.
A/RES/80/21	2025	General Assembly	Further practical measures against an arms race in space; noted the working group's 2025-2028 timetable.

2B. THE TREATY FOUNDATION

The Outer Space Treaty and its four companion treaties are the core of space law. Most space powers have joined the first four, but the Moon Agreement has few parties. The committee that writes these rules, COPUOS, has grown from 18 members to 110.

United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, Last Accessed: October 2026: The Outer Space Treaty forbids national claims and weapons of mass destruction in orbit

Tagline: Banning claims and nuclear weapons

Source: According to... United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, Last Accessed: October 2026

Link: <https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introouterspacetreaty.html>

Fact: It states... The Outer Space Treaty says space exploration should benefit all countries, that no state may claim space or celestial bodies, and that nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction may not be placed in orbit or on celestial bodies. The Moon and other bodies are for peaceful purposes only. States are responsible for their national space activities, including those of private companies, and are liable for damage their space objects cause.

This means... The treaty bans weapons of mass destruction, but not other weapons such as missiles, lasers or jammers. This gap is at the centre of the Council's debate.

COPUOS Legal Subcommittee (A/AC.105/C.2/2025/CRP.9), May 5, 2025: 116 states are parties to the Outer Space Treaty, but only 17 to the Moon Agreement

Tagline: Counting parties to space treaties

Source: According to... COPUOS Legal Subcommittee, May 5, 2025

Link:

https://www.unoosa.org/res/oosadoc/data/documents/2025/aac_105c_22025crp/aac_105c_22025crp_9_0_html/AC105_C2_2025_CRP09E.pdf

Fact: It states... As of January 1, 2025, the Outer Space Treaty had 116 states parties and 23 more that had signed only. The Rescue Agreement and the Liability Convention each had 100 parties, the Registration Convention had 76, and the Moon Agreement had 17. The Outer Space Treaty was adopted on December 19, 1966, opened for signature on January 27, 1967, and entered into force on October 10, 1967.

This means... About 77 UN members are still not full parties to the Outer Space Treaty. A 2100 Council could require universal acceptance of its core rules, but it must recognise that the Moon Agreement has very little support.

United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, Last Accessed: October 2026: COPUOS has grown from 18 members in 1958 to 110 in 2025

Tagline: Growing COPUOS membership sixfold

Source: According to... United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, Last Accessed: October 2026

Link: <https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/members/evolution.html>

Fact: It states... COPUOS began with 18 members in 1958 (resolution 1348 (XIII)) and 24 in 1959 (resolution 1472 (XIV)). Membership reached 100 in 2021, 102 in 2022, 104 in 2024 and 110 in 2025. Mongolia was among the members added in 1961.

This means... More countries want a voice in space rules, but COPUOS works by consensus, so every new member makes agreement harder. Delegates must decide whether the Security Council should act when COPUOS cannot agree.

2C. THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN ORBIT

In April 2024, a Security Council draft resolution co-sponsored by dozens of states would have reaffirmed the ban on nuclear weapons in orbit. It came amid concern, noted by CSIS (see 1A), that Russia could deploy a nuclear anti-satellite weapon. Russia vetoed it. The General Assembly then adopted similar language later that year.

United Nations Security Council (S/2024/302), April 24, 2024: A draft co-sponsored by dozens of states on keeping nuclear weapons out of orbit

Tagline: Proposing a nuclear-free orbit

Source: According to... United Nations Security Council, April 24, 2024

Link: <https://undocs.org/en/S/2024/302>

Fact: It states... Draft resolution S/2024/302, dated April 24, 2024, was co-sponsored by a long list of states from every region, including Albania, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Colombia, France, Germany, Japan and many others. It would have affirmed the obligation of all parties to the Outer Space Treaty not to place nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit.

This means... Support for the rule was broad, but broad support is not enough in the Security Council. Delegates in 2100 must plan for the veto when they draft any space resolution.

United Nations Press (SC/15678), April 24, 2024: Russia vetoed the draft, 13 in favour, 1 against, 1 abstention

Tagline: Vetoing the space nuclear draft

Source: According to... United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, April 24, 2024

Link: <https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15678.doc.htm>

Fact: It states... The Security Council failed to adopt the draft resolution. Thirteen members voted in favour, the Russian Federation voted against, and China abstained. Because Russia is a permanent member, its negative vote was a veto. The draft would have affirmed that all parties must fully comply with the Outer Space Treaty, including not placing nuclear weapons in orbit, on celestial bodies or anywhere in space.

This means... Even a rule that repeats an existing treaty can be blocked. In 2100, delegates must find language that all five permanent members can accept, or decide whether to work around the Council through the General Assembly.

United Nations Press (SC/15700), May 20, 2024: A rival Russian draft banning all weapons in space failed, 7 in favour, 7 against, 1 abstention

Tagline: Failing the rival space draft

Source: According to... United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, May 20, 2024

Link: <https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15700.doc.htm>

Fact: It states... Less than a month after the April veto, the Council voted on a second draft (S/2024/383, dated May 20, 2024) proposed by Russia with Belarus, China, North Korea, Nicaragua and Syria. It would have reaffirmed that states must not place any kind of weapon in space, not only weapons of mass destruction. Seven members voted in favour (Algeria, China, Ecuador, Guyana, Mozambique, Russia and Sierra Leone), seven voted against (France, Japan, Malta, the Republic of Korea, Slovenia, the United Kingdom and the United States) and Switzerland abstained. A draft needs nine votes in favour, so it failed. The United States said the draft was a distraction from a Russian satellite it believed was a likely counterspace weapon; the Republic of Korea said that because space systems are dual use, defining a "weapon" in space is very difficult.

This means... In 2024 each camp blocked the other's text in the same month. The Council splits not over whether space should stay peaceful, but over which weapons to ban and how to define them. A 2100 resolution needs a definition of "space weapon" that both camps can accept.

United Nations General Assembly (A/RES/79/18), December 2, 2024: The General Assembly affirmed the ban on weapons of mass destruction in orbit

Tagline: Reaffirming the nuclear ban elsewhere

Source: According to... United Nations General Assembly, December 2, 2024

Link: <https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/79/18>

Fact: It states... The resolution "Weapons of mass destruction in outer space" affirms the obligation of all parties to the Outer Space Treaty not to place in orbit any objects carrying nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. It warns of the serious consequences of such weapons for the long-term sustainability of space, for sustainable development and for civilian services. It urges all states to join and comply with the treaty.

This means... When the Council was blocked, the General Assembly adopted the same idea. This shows a real path for delegates: if the Council cannot agree, the General Assembly can still state the world's position, even though it cannot bind anyone.

2D. DEBRIS AND SUSTAINABILITY AT THE UN

The UN has adopted voluntary guidelines for reducing debris and keeping space usable over the long term. These guidelines have helped, but they are not binding, and debris keeps growing.

United Nations General Assembly (A/RES/62/217), December 22, 2007: Endorsing the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines

Tagline: Endorsing debris mitigation guidelines

Source: According to... United Nations General Assembly, December 22, 2007

Link: <https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/62/217>

Fact: It states... In this resolution on international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space, the General Assembly endorses the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of COPUOS. It also urges states that have not joined the space treaties to consider ratifying them.

This means... The world has had voluntary debris rules since 2007, yet debris has grown sharply since then (see the ESA entry in 1A). Delegates can use this as evidence that voluntary rules alone are not enough.

United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, Last Accessed: October 2026: UNOOSA keeps a compendium of national debris standards

Tagline: Compiling national debris standards

Source: According to... United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, Last Accessed: October 2026

Link: <https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/topics/space-debris/index.html>

Fact: It states... The UN General Assembly endorsed the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines in 2007. At the request of states, UNOOSA compiled a public compendium of space debris mitigation standards adopted by states and international organisations to support discussions in the Legal Subcommittee.

This means... Each country sets its own debris standards, so the rules differ from place to place. A 2100 Council could set one minimum standard so that companies cannot choose the weakest country to license their satellites.

United Nations General Assembly (A/RES/74/82), December 13, 2019: Welcoming 21 guidelines for long-term sustainability

Tagline: Welcoming twenty-one sustainability guidelines

Source: According to... United Nations General Assembly, December 13, 2019

Link: <https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/74/82>

Fact: It states... The General Assembly welcomed with appreciation COPUOS's adoption of a preamble and 21 guidelines for the long-term sustainability of outer space activities. It noted the creation of a working group to continue the work, and urged all members, especially those with major space capabilities, to help prevent an arms race in space.

This means... The 21 guidelines are the most detailed agreed rules for safe space behaviour. Delegates can reference them directly instead of writing new rules from nothing.

2E. SECURITY TALKS AND THE PACT FOR THE FUTURE

The General Assembly has created several working groups on space security and, in 2024, agreed in the Pact for the Future to discuss new frameworks for traffic, debris and resources.

United Nations General Assembly (A/RES/76/231), December 24, 2021: Opening a working group on responsible space behaviour

Tagline: Opening a working group

Source: According to... United Nations General Assembly, December 24, 2021

Link: <https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/76/231>

Fact: It states... The General Assembly decided to convene, beginning in 2022, an open-ended working group to take stock of existing international law and other rules about state behaviour in space, and to consider current and future threats. The Secretary-General was asked to send its report to the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission. In 2023, resolution A/RES/78/20 created a new working group in Geneva to continue this work.

This means... The UN keeps talking about space security in working groups, but the talks produce reports, not binding rules. The Security Council is the only UN body that could turn their findings into binding decisions.

United Nations General Assembly (A/RES/79/1), September 22, 2024: The Pact for the Future calls the Outer Space Treaty the cornerstone of space law

Tagline: Calling for new space frameworks

Source: According to... United Nations General Assembly, September 22, 2024

Link: <https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/79/1>

Fact: It states... In Action 56 of the Pact for the Future, world leaders agreed that the Outer Space Treaty is the cornerstone of space law and that the growth in objects in orbit and the return of humans to deep space demand urgent action. They decided to discuss new frameworks for space traffic, space debris and space resources through COPUOS, invited the private sector to take part, and encouraged consultation on holding a fourth UN conference on outer space (UNISPACE IV) in 2027.

This means... World leaders have already agreed that new frameworks are needed. Delegates in 2100 (a fiction assumption) can imagine what those frameworks became and debate whether they worked.

United Nations General Assembly (A/RES/80/21), December 1, 2025: One combined working group on space arms now meets from 2025 to 2028

Tagline: Merging the space security talks

Source: According to... United Nations General Assembly, December 1, 2025

Link: <https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/80/21>

Fact: It states... The resolution "Further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space" notes that the General Assembly, in decision 79/512 of December 2, 2024, set up an open-ended working group, and welcomes the group's agreement by consensus on its agenda and an indicative timetable for 2025-2028. The same day, resolution A/RES/80/19 welcomed this "new consolidated" working group on the prevention of an arms race in outer space "in all its aspects". Resolution 80/21 also recommends considering the main elements of a legally binding instrument, including on preventing the placement of weapons in space.

This means... The UN joined its separate space security talks into one group that runs until 2028. The group can only recommend, and its timetable runs to 2028, so delegates can argue that slow, consensus-based talks are exactly why a binding Council decision may be needed.

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, February 9, 2026: The new working group is seen as a bridge between the binding-treaty camp and the voluntary-rules camp

Tagline: Bridging two camps on space rules

Source: According to... United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, February 9, 2026

Link: https://unidir.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/UNIDIR_Outer_Space_Security_Conference_2025_Report.pdf

Fact: It states... UNIDIR's report on its 2025 Outer Space Security Conference, held in Geneva on September 9-10, 2025 with more than 1,000 participants, says panellists saw the combined working group on preventing an arms race in space as a forum to bring together states that favour legally binding instruments and states that favour non-binding measures. Some speakers warned against treating it as a "silver bullet." Some said non-binding measures "cannot substitute" for binding ones, while others valued them as steps along the way. Panellists also said commercial companies "are under pressure to offer exclusive services to States," with unclear rules on responsibility, and one proposed defining a threat by three elements: intent, behaviour and harmful impact.

This means... Even inside the UN's own research institute, experts do not agree whether binding or voluntary rules should come first. Delegates can borrow the three-part test (intent, behaviour, harmful impact) to write a definition of a "space threat" that both camps might accept.

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, October 2026: Space safety is handled in Vienna and space security in Geneva, and some issues fall between them

Tagline: Splitting space talks between two cities

Source: According to... United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, event notice for October 26, 2026

Link: <https://unidir.org/event/strengthening-coordination-in-space-safety-and-space-security-governance/>

Fact: It states... At the UN, space safety is handled in Vienna by the General Assembly's Fourth Committee and COPUOS, while space security is handled in Geneva and New York by the First Committee, the Conference on Disarmament and the working group on preventing an arms race in space. The split has historical roots and helps keep COPUOS a cooperative forum. However, issues such as debris, crowded orbits and activity on the Moon do not fit neatly on either side: they "require technical cooperation to manage safely" but are "increasingly shaped by strategic competition and security concerns among States." UNIDIR warns that such issues risk being handled twice without coordination, or passed back and forth between forums and delayed. UNIDIR is holding a side event on this question at UN Headquarters on October 26, 2026, during the 81st session of the First Committee.

This means... The UN's space work is divided in a way that lets important problems slip through the gaps. The Security Council is the one body whose mandate covers both peace and security, so delegates can argue that it is the natural place to join safety and security together for issues such as debris and the Moon.

2F. SPACE FOR DISASTERS AND DEVELOPMENT

Not all UN space work is about danger. The UN also helps countries use satellites to save lives and support development.

United Nations General Assembly (A/RES/61/110), December 14, 2006: Creating UN-SPIDER

Tagline: Creating UN-SPIDER for disasters

Source: According to... United Nations General Assembly, December 14, 2006

Link: <https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/61/110>

Fact: It states... The General Assembly established the United Nations Platform for Space-based Information for Disaster Management and Emergency Response (UN-SPIDER). The resolution expresses serious concern about the devastating impact of disasters, which cause loss of life and property and destroy livelihoods.

This means... Satellites help poorer countries respond to floods, earthquakes and storms. Any rule that limits satellites, or any war that destroys them, would also harm disaster response.

UN-SPIDER, Last Accessed: October 2026: A single access point for space-based disaster information

Tagline: Sharing satellite data in emergencies

Source: According to... UN-SPIDER, Last Accessed: October 2026

Link: <https://www.un-spider.org/about/what-is-un-spider>

Fact: It states... UN-SPIDER helps all countries access satellite data and build the skills to use it across the whole disaster cycle, including risk reduction. It links the disaster management and space communities, builds capacity especially in developing countries, and has offices in Vienna, Bonn and Beijing.

This means... The UN already runs a working programme that shares space benefits. Delegates can argue that protecting satellites is also protecting humanitarian work.

2G. WHAT IS WORKING AND WHAT IS NOT

1. **Working:** The Outer Space Treaty has held since 1967. No state has placed a nuclear weapon in orbit, and no state has openly claimed territory on the Moon.
2. **Working:** Voluntary guidelines on debris (2007) and long-term sustainability (2019) were agreed by consensus, and many operators follow them.

3. **Working:** UN programmes such as UN-SPIDER share satellite benefits with developing countries.
4. **Not working:** Debris keeps growing despite voluntary guidelines (see ESA, 1A).
5. **Not working:** Binding treaty talks on space weapons have stalled for decades (see UNODA, 1B).
6. **Not working:** The Security Council's only major space draft was vetoed in 2024 (see 2C).
7. **Not working:** There is still no international body to manage space traffic or coordinate debris removal (see the Secretary-General's Policy Brief, 1A).

2H. WHERE THE MAJOR BLOCS STAND (PRESENT DAY, 2026)

Everything in this section describes the real positions of countries and groups in 2026, not in 2100. The committee is set in the future, but delegates who know where today's space powers stand can reason about how those positions might have changed by 2100 (a fiction assumption). Each position is drawn from a source already opened for this report.

1. **United States:** The United States prefers voluntary norms, resilience and its own military strength over new binding treaties, and in 2025 it voted against basic UN resolutions on preventing an arms race in space. In 2026 its officials confirmed that the Space Force has weapons in orbit, and a December 2025 order aims to return US astronauts to the Moon by 2028.
 - According to... Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, June 2026; Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 5, 2026
2. **Russia:** Russia calls for a binding treaty that bans placing any weapon in space, and it put forward its own Security Council draft on this in May 2024, one month after it vetoed the draft on nuclear weapons in orbit. Western members say Russia's proposals distract from its own suspected counterspace satellite.
 - According to... United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, May 20, 2024
3. **China:** China co-sponsored Russia's 2024 draft, abstained on the nuclear draft, and accused "a certain country" of treating space as a war-fighting domain, while saying "It will take long-term efforts to build consensus." China leads the International Lunar Research Station with Russia and signalled in a 2025 white paper that it is willing to engage in multilateral space security talks.
 - According to... United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, May 20, 2024; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, June 2026
4. **United Kingdom, France, Japan, the Republic of Korea and the European Union:** These Council members voted against Russia's 2024 draft, arguing that a "weapon" in space is hard to define because most systems are dual use, and they support norms of responsible behaviour. The European Union is also writing its own binding EU Space Act on safety, cybersecurity and debris that would apply to any operator, European or not, that serves the European market.
 - According to... United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, May 20, 2024; European Commission, June 25, 2025
5. **African and other developing Council members:** Algeria, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Guyana and Ecuador voted for Russia's 2024 draft, with Guyana calling space a "shared global commons" and Sierra Leone calling any resolution on preventing an arms race in space a "pivotal step." At COPUOS in 2026, a dispute over the term "developing countries" helped block the Committee's report, showing how strongly these states want their place in space rules recognised.
 - According to... United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, May 20, 2024; Secure World Foundation, July 16, 2026
6. **The Artemis Accords group:** Seventy-six countries, nearly 40% of the world's nations, have signed the US-led Artemis Accords, which allow resource extraction and use "safety zones" on the Moon. The group now meets twice a year outside the UN system.
 - According to... National Aeronautics and Space Administration, September 28, 2026

2I. REDRESS: WHAT A NATION CAN DO WHEN ANOTHER DAMAGES ITS SPACE PROPERTY

Redress means getting a loss repaired or paid back. Today a nation has three main paths when another nation's space activity harms it: a claim for money under the 1972 Liability Convention, a formal report to the UN under the Outer Space Treaty, and a complaint about radio interference to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). The best-known claim, over the Soviet satellite Cosmos 954, ended in an agreement rather than a ruling, and none of these paths comes with a way to force a state to comply. That gap is what the Council of 2100 (a fiction assumption) is asked to fill.

United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, Last Accessed: October 2026: The Liability Convention sets a claims process that ends in a Claims Commission

Tagline: Claiming payment for space damage

Source: According to... United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, Last Accessed: October 2026

Link: <https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/liability-convention.html>

Fact: It states... The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (approved by resolution 2777 (XXVI) in 1971, in force since September 1972) says a launching state "shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation" for damage its space object causes on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft in flight (Article II). For damage in space, a state is liable "only if the damage is due to its fault" (Article III). A claim "shall be presented to a launching State through diplomatic channels" (Article IX), normally within one year of the damage (Article X). If no settlement is reached within one year, either side may ask for a Claims Commission (Article XIV). The Commission's decision is "final and binding if the parties have so agreed"; otherwise it gives a "recommendatory award" that the parties must consider honestly and seriously (Article XIX).

This means... For damage in orbit, the harmed nation must prove the other nation was at fault, which is hard when no one can see clearly what happened hundreds of kilometres up. Even then, the Claims Commission's answer is only advice unless both sides agreed in advance to obey it. Delegates can propose that the Council make Claims Commission decisions binding, or that the Council itself enforce them.

Government of Canada, April 2, 1981: The Soviet Union paid Canada 3 million Canadian dollars after Cosmos 954 fell on Canadian territory

Tagline: Settling a famous space claim

Source: According to... Government of Canada, Canada Treaty Series 1981 No. 8, April 2, 1981

Link: <https://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/text-texte.aspx?id=103429>

Fact: It states... In a protocol signed in Moscow on April 2, 1981, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agreed to "pay to the Government of Canada the sum of three million Canadian dollars" in "full and final settlement of all matters connected with the disintegration of the Soviet satellite" Cosmos-954 in January 1978. Canada accepted the payment as settlement of all those matters, "including the claim advanced by Canada in this respect." The protocol entered into force on the date of signature.

This means... The one famous case of a nation being paid for space damage ended in a deal between two governments, not a court ruling, more than three years after the accident. Delegates can use it to show that redress is possible, but slow, and depends on both sides being willing to talk.

McGill Law Journal, September 1982: Canada claimed about 6 million dollars for the Cosmos 954 cleanup and accepted half

Tagline: Recovering only part of the cost

Source: According to... McGill Law Journal, Volume 27, No. 4, September 1982 (Bryan Schwartz and Mark L. Berlin)

Link: <https://lawjournal.mcgill.ca/?p=15061>

Fact: It states... Cosmos 954 was a Soviet nuclear-powered satellite that re-entered the atmosphere in January 1978, and "radioactive debris scattered over Canadian territory" near Great Slave Lake. Canada's search and clean-up effort, Operation Morning Light, lasted until mid-October 1978 and cost nearly fourteen million dollars in total, but Canada claimed only its extra costs of \$6,041,174.70. Canada based its claim on the Liability Convention and on general international law. The authors call the final agreement "a three million dollar settlement which did not expressly acknowledge legal liability."

This means... Canada spent far more than it asked for, asked for far more than it received, and the Soviet Union never admitted it was legally responsible. Delegates can argue that the Liability Convention needs a faster and fairer system, especially for dangers such as radioactive debris that could harm people for a long time.

United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (A/AC.105/1262), December 6, 2021: China reported two close approaches by Starlink satellites to its space station

Tagline: Reporting danger to the UN

Source: According to... United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, December 6, 2021

Link: https://www.unoosa.org/res/oosadoc/data/documents/2021/aac_105/aac_1051262_0_html/AAC105_1262E.pdf

Fact: It states... In a note dated December 3, 2021, China's Permanent Mission in Vienna told the UN Secretary-General, under Article V of the Outer Space Treaty, that SpaceX Starlink satellites had made two close approaches to the China Space Station, on July 1 and October 21, 2021. Each time, "For safety reasons, the China Space Station took the initiative to conduct an evasive manoeuvre." China asked the Secretary-General to remind all treaty parties that "States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space," including those of private companies.

This means... No damage occurred, so China had no claim for money, but it used the UN to put the incident on the public record and to remind the United States that it is responsible for its companies. Delegates can point to this as a peaceful first step that a harmed or threatened nation can take before any claim for redress.

International Telecommunication Union, Radio Regulations Board (RRB24-2/13), July 15, 2024: The ITU condemned deliberate interference with European satellites traced to Russia

Tagline: Condemning deliberate satellite jamming

Source: According to... International Telecommunication Union, Minutes of the 96th Meeting of the Radio Regulations Board, July 15, 2024

Link: https://itu.int/dms_pub/itu-r/md/24/rrb24.2/c/R24-RRB24.2-C-0013!!PDF-E.pdf

Fact: It states... Luxembourg, Sweden, France, the Netherlands and Ukraine complained that their satellites, which mainly carried Ukrainian television and radio, were receiving interfering signals that had been "geolocated" to the Russian Federation or Crimea. Meeting in June 2024, the ITU's Radio Regulations Board "expressed its grave concern regarding the use of signals to cause intentional harmful interference" and "condemned such actions in the strictest terms," saying they broke No. 15.1 of the Radio Regulations. The Board asked Russia "to immediately cease any deliberate action to cause harmful interference" and told the ITU's Bureau to bring the countries together to resolve the problem.

This means... A UN agency can publicly name and condemn a nation for jamming, but it cannot punish that nation or order it to pay. Delegates can argue that the Council of 2100 (a fiction assumption) could give such findings real force, for example by treating repeated deliberate jamming as a threat to peace.

2J. CLAIMS: MAY ANY NATION OWN A PART OF SPACE?

Article II of the Outer Space Treaty says outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, "is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means." Even so, nations keep testing this rule. In 2024 Colombia stated that part of the geostationary orbit belongs to it, and other states objected. The Artemis Accords, meanwhile, say that taking resources is not a claim of territory and introduce "safety zones," which critics fear could work like claims.

Netherlands Treaty Database, Last Accessed: October 2026: Six European and North American states objected to Colombia's claim to part of the geostationary orbit

Tagline: Rejecting a claim to orbit

Source: According to... Netherlands Treaty Database (Government of the Netherlands), Last Accessed: October 2026

Link: https://treatydatabase.overheid.nl/en/Treaty/Details/003428_b

Fact: It states... When Colombia ratified the Outer Space Treaty, it made an "interpretative declaration," recorded with the date April 15, 2024, saying that "the segment of the geostationary orbit corresponding to Colombia is part of Colombia." Germany objected on January 27, 2025, saying the declaration "has no effect with regard to the legal obligations" of Colombia under Article II and is "incompatible with the object and purpose of the Outer Space Treaty." France, Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Sweden objected between January 31 and March 19, 2025. Germany, Canada and Sweden said the treaty still enters into force between them and Colombia, but without the claim. The same record quotes Article II: outer space "is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means."

This means... A real nation claimed a region of space as recently as 2024, and the answer came from other states' written objections, not from any court or UN body. Delegates can argue that the Council of 2100 (a fiction assumption) needs a clear way to rule on such claims, and delegates from equatorial countries may argue that the orbit above them deserves special protection.

National Aeronautics and Space Administration, October 13, 2020: The Artemis Accords say mining is not a claim of territory and that safety zones "will ultimately be temporary"

Tagline: Defining safety zones in writing

Source: According to... National Aeronautics and Space Administration, The Artemis Accords (signed text), October 13, 2020

Link: <https://www3.nasa.gov/specials/artemis-accords/img/Artemis-Accords-signed-13Oct2020.pdf>

Fact: It states... In Section 10, the signatories "affirm that the extraction of space resources does not inherently constitute national appropriation under Article II of the Outer Space Treaty." In Section 11, a safety zone is "the area in which nominal operations of a relevant activity or an anomalous event could reasonably cause harmful interference." Safety zones "will ultimately be temporary, ending when the relevant operation ceases," and the signatories "should promptly notify each other as well as the Secretary-General of the United Nations" about them.

This means... The Accords promise that safety zones are temporary and reported to the UN, but they do not set a time limit or a size limit. Delegates who support the Accords can quote these words as proof that safety zones are not claims; delegates who are worried can argue that a zone lasting as long as a permanent base could become a claim in practice, so the Council should set limits.