

HMDC Presents... DISEC: Sample Draft Resolution

HMDC Presents... Sample Draft Resolution: DISEC: Drone Surveillance and Privacy

THIS IS A MODEL TO LEARN FROM, NOT TO COPY. We study this sample at home to learn the shape of a resolution and the kind of ideas that belong in it. Then we write every clause live, in our own words, with our bloc.

HOW A RESOLUTION IS BUILT

A resolution has two kinds of clauses. **Preambulatory clauses** come first: they explain why the committee is acting by recalling past resolutions, treaties and facts. Each one begins with an *italic* opening word or phrase, such as *Recalling* or *Deeply alarmed*, and ends with a comma. **Operative clauses** come second: they say what the committee will actually do. Each one is numbered, begins with a **bold** (or underlined) verb, such as **Urges** or **Requests**, and ends with a semicolon, except the final clause, which ends with a period. DISEC is a General Assembly committee, so it cannot pass binding law; our operative verbs therefore *recommend*, *urge*, *request* and *encourage* instead of commanding.

THE SAMPLE DRAFT RESOLUTION

Committee: Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) **Topic:** Drone Surveillance and Privacy **Sponsors:** The French Republic, the Italian Republic, [co-sponsors] **Signatories:** [signatories]

The Disarmament and International Security Committee,

Recalling Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which protect every person from arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy,

Reaffirming General Assembly resolution 68/167 (2013) on the right to privacy in the digital age, resolution 77/211 (2022), which asks states to review their laws on mass surveillance and biometric technology regularly, and resolution 79/175 (2024), which warns that facial recognition without proper safeguards can harm human rights,

Noting with concern Human Rights Council resolutions 50/21 (2022) and 58/23 (2025), which express concern about "aerial surveillance vehicles" watching peaceful protesters and human rights defenders,

Recognizing Security Council resolution 2370 (2017), which condemns the flow of unmanned aircraft systems to terrorist groups, and resolution 2617 (2021), which recognises the need to balance new technology with preventing misuse,

Deeply concerned that the largest military drones can stay airborne for more than 20 hours and collect private conversations sent through mobile phones and computers (UN Human Rights Council, August 15, 2020), and that metadata gathered by surveillance has even been used to find targets for lethal drone strikes (UN Human Rights Council, June 30, 2014),

Alarmed that drone surveillance has moved "from the battlefield to the home front," with more than 1,000 police departments in the United States using drones (UN Human Rights Council, March 1, 2023), and that watching protests from the air has become normal in many countries (UN Human Rights Council, August 4, 2022),

Observing that the European Union Artificial Intelligence Act and the Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence both leave aside military and national defence uses, so that neither of them covers military or intelligence drone surveillance,

1. **Urges** member states to allow drone surveillance only when it is lawful, necessary and proportionate (no greater than the lawful goal requires), and further recommends that member states:
 - a. Limit each surveillance flight to specific places and specific times;
 - b. Delete stored footage and data after a set period;
 - c. Require approval from a judge or an independent authority before any intrusive use;
 - d. Keep public logs of aerial surveillance;
2. **Recommends** that member states require the registration of drones that carry cameras or other sensors able to capture personal data, and consider privacy no-fly zones over homes, schools, hospitals and places of worship;
3. **Calls upon** member states to ensure that facial recognition and other biometric identification from drones are never used for mass surveillance or arbitrarily against people at peaceful assemblies;
4. **Encourages** states that export drones and AI cameras to adopt clear, published criteria for transfers of military and dual-use (both civilian and military) drones and their components, and encourages companies to check how buyers will use these systems before selling them, so that these tools do not reach governments likely to abuse them or armed groups;
5. **Requests** that law enforcement agencies plan drone operations in advance, record their use, and hold independent and impartial investigations whenever a drone operation causes death or serious injury;
6. **Recommends** that member states apply the safeguards in clauses 1 and 3, as far as possible, to drone surveillance and intelligence gathering by military and security agencies, and further recommends that member states:
 - a. Review their national security exceptions regularly;
 - b. Consider joining Convention 108+ of the Council of Europe, which protects personal data and is open to states outside Europe;
7. **Encourages** cooperation against terrorist drones under Security Council resolution 2370 (2017) and the Berlin Memorandum of the Global Counterterrorism Forum, on the condition that counter-drone detection systems are never used for mass surveillance of ordinary people;
8. **Requests** the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) to update its 2017 study on transparency, oversight and accountability for armed drones so that it also covers surveillance drones and AI cameras, and to report to this committee at a future session;

9. **Invites** the International Civil Aviation Organization to include privacy in its guidance on drones, and requests technical assistance for developing states that wish to build drone registration systems and independent oversight bodies.
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HOW WE MERGE AND AMEND IN COMMITTEE

1. **Keeping to the December focus:** Harvard's December session is about privacy, surveillance and intelligence, and about shared rules for the "responsible use of drones" (Harvard Model United Nations, HMUN Online Committee Page, Last Accessed: October 2026). Armed drones and autonomous weapons belong to the October session, so this sample mentions strikes only once, in the fifth preambulatory clause, to show why surveillance data matters. If another bloc adds a treaty on killer robots, we politely ask the chair whether it fits the December topic.
2. **Merging with a security-first bloc:** The Gulf states see drones mainly as a terrorism threat, after Houthi drone attacks aimed at Mecca (United Nations Meetings Coverage, October 7, 2026). If their bloc writes a paper on stopping terrorist drones, we can merge: we accept a stronger clause 7 on counter-drone cooperation, and they accept our clauses 1 and 3, so that counter-drone tools come with privacy safeguards.
3. **Choosing words that can pass:** Exporting states may see export controls as a threat to their industries, and military and intelligence agencies often claim national security exceptions. We therefore ask states to write their own national rules in clauses 1 to 6, instead of creating a global regulator, and clause 6 says "as far as possible." When a supplier objects, we answer that 51 percent of advanced democracies also use AI surveillance, so these rules are not aimed at any one country (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 17, 2019).
4. **Amending through the right steps:** An amendment changes a clause after the draft is on the floor. Before we write one, we ask the chair how many signatures it needs and how the committee votes on it, because the chair sets those steps for our session. Then we gather the signatures, show the change to the sponsors first, and accept their help with the wording whenever it keeps our idea.

HMDC Forensics, Harvard MUN Online, December 2026

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