

HMDC Presents... DISEC: Sample Position Paper

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THIS IS A MODEL TO LEARN FROM, NOT TO COPY. We use this sample to see how one real country's facts fit into the four HMDC parts on a single page. We read it once for the ideas, a second time for the shape, and then we close it and write our own paper about our own country in our own words. Harvard asks for our own work, so even if one of us is assigned France, we start again from our Country Report and never reuse these sentences.

THE SAMPLE PAPER

Committee: Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) **Topic:** Drone Surveillance and Privacy **Country:** The French Republic

Background of the Topic. The French Republic believes that drones have become the world's most flexible tool for gathering information about people, and that international law has not kept pace. The largest military drones can stay in the air for more than 20 hours and can pick up private conversations sent through mobile phones and computers (UN Human Rights Council, August 15, 2020). A spy drone weighing less than 20 grams flies almost silently (UN Human Rights Council, March 1, 2023). Drones have also moved "from the battlefield to the home front": more than 1,000 police departments in the United States use them (UN Human Rights Council, March 1, 2023), and many governments now watch protests from the air (UN Human Rights Council, August 4, 2022). At least 75 countries use artificial intelligence (AI) for surveillance, 64 of them with facial recognition (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 17, 2019). In war, this information can become a target list, as drone cameras in Kherson, Ukraine, showed (OHCHR, May 28, 2025). The root cause is a gap in the law: even the strongest rules on AI do not cover military or national security uses (EUR-Lex, June 13, 2024).

UN and International Action. France recalls General Assembly resolution 68/167 (2013), the first on the right to privacy in the digital age, and resolution 79/175 (2024), which warns that facial recognition without safeguards can harm human rights. France also notes Human Rights Council resolution 50/21 (2022), which names "aerial surveillance vehicles" at protests, and resolution 58/23 (2025), which says biometric technology must not be used for mass surveillance. Security Council resolution 2617 (2021) recognises the need to balance new technology with preventing terrorist misuse of drones. Yet no UN resolution deals directly with drone surveillance.

Our Country's Policy. As a member of the European Union, France applies rules that require drones carrying cameras to be registered, because of the risk to privacy, and that allow states to close airspace for privacy reasons (EUR-Lex, May 24, 2019). Under EU law, live face scanning by police in public places is largely banned, and each exception needs approval from a judge or an independent authority (EUR-Lex, June 13, 2024). France's national interests, which it will not compromise, are the privacy of its people and their safety from terrorist drones, which can be used to spy on targets (Global Counterterrorism Forum, Last Accessed: October 2026). Its negotiable policies include the exact police exceptions, how much security information states publish, and how quickly new rules take effect.

Proposed Solutions and Expected Opposition. France proposes, first, an international standard that allows drone surveillance only when it is necessary and proportionate (no greater than the lawful goal requires), limited in time and place, with stored data deleted after a set period (OHCHR, September 16, 2022). Second, France proposes that every state register camera drones and draw privacy no-fly zones. Third, France proposes that facial recognition from drones never be used for mass surveillance, and that exporters publish clear criteria so drones do not reach governments likely to abuse them (UN Human Rights Council, August 15, 2020). France expects the Gulf states, which have faced Houthi drone attacks, to put counter-terrorism first (United Nations Meetings Coverage, October 7, 2026). Exporting states may also resist, since Chinese companies supplied AI surveillance to 63 countries and US companies were present in 32 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 17, 2019). France will answer that 51 percent of advanced democracies also use AI surveillance, so these rules protect everyone, and that the Security Council itself asks for balance.

HOW THIS SAMPLE IS BUILT

1. **Building the background from Part 1, Section 1A:** We chose only the surveillance entries from the HMDC report's list of harms: large drones that collect phone conversations, the 20-gram spy drone, police drones at home, drones at protests and the Carnegie count of AI surveillance. We used the Kherson entry for one sentence only, because armed drones belong to Harvard's October session, and then used the "Military and national security AI is excluded" entry in Section 1D to name the root cause.
2. **Choosing UN action from Part 2:** We did not list every resolution in the report's table (2A). We picked 68/167 and 79/175 from Section 2B, 50/21 and 58/23 from Section 2C and 2617 from Section 2F. Then we used Section 2H, "What Is Working and What Is Not," to point out the gaps.
3. **Writing the policy from the EU entries:** France's home rules come from the EU entries in Sections 1C and 1D, and its interest in safety from terrorist drones comes from the Global Counterterrorism Forum entry in Section 1A. We left out France's position on autonomous weapons, because it belongs to the October session, not to the privacy and surveillance focus our chairs will use in December.
4. **Separating interests from policies:** We wrote one firm sentence for the national interests and one flexible sentence for the negotiable policies, as Harvard asks. The flexible sentence tells other delegates exactly where France can compromise.
5. **Turning report solutions into proposals:** Each proposal comes from Part 1: legal limits from Section 1B, registration and no-fly zones from Section 1C, and face scanning and export criteria from Sections 1D and 1E. The opposition comes from the Gulf entry in Section 2I and the Carnegie entry in Section 1A, and the answer comes from the same Carnegie entry and Section 2F.
6. **Checking the length:** The body of the paper, from "Background of the Topic" to the end of the solutions, is about 595 words, counting the four bold part labels, which keeps it inside HMDC's range of 450 to 600 words.

HMDC Forensics, Harvard MUN Online, December 2026